ATtention Spanned: Comprehensive Vulnerability Analysis of AT Commands Within the Android Ecosystem presented at 27thUsenixSecuritySymposium 2018

by Patrick Traynor, Hayawardh Vijayakumar, Kevin Butler, Michael Grace, Amir Rahmati, Lee Harrison, Grant Hernandez, Dave (jing) Tian, Joseph I. Choi, Vanessa Frost, Christie Ruales,

URL : https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/tian

Summary : AT commands, originally designed in the early 80s for controlling modems, are still in use in most modern smartphones to support telephony functions. The role of AT commands in these devices has vastly expanded through vendor-specific customizations, yet the extent of their functionality is unclear and poorly documented. In this paper, we systematically retrieve and extract 3,500 AT commands from over 2,000 Android smartphone firmware images across 11 vendors. We methodically test our corpus of AT commands against eight Android devices from four different vendors through their USB interface and characterize the powerful functionality exposed, including the ability to rewrite device firmware, bypass Android security mechanisms, exfiltrate sensitive device information, perform screen unlocks, and inject touch events solely through the use of AT commands. We demonstrate that the AT command interface contains an alarming amount of unconstrained functionality and represents a broad attack surface on Android devices. Charm: Facilitating Dynamic Analysis of Device Drivers of Mobile SystemsSeyed Mohammadjavad Seyed Talebi, Hamid Tavakoli, Hang Zhang, Zheng Zhang, Ardalan Amiri Sani, Zhiyun Qianhttps://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/talebihttps://www.usenix.org/sites/default/files/conference/protected-files/security18_slides_talebi.pdfMobile systems, such as smartphones and tablets, incorporate a diverse set of I/O devices, such as camera, audio devices, GPU, and sensors. This in turn results in a large number of diverse and customized device drivers running in the operating system kernel of mobile systems. These device drivers contain various bugs and vulnerabilities, making them a top target for kernel exploits [78]. Unfortunately, security analysts face important challenges in analyzing these device drivers in order to find, understand, and patch vulnerabilities. More specifically, using the state-of-the-art dynamic analysis techniques such as interactive debugging, fuzzing, and record-and-replay for analysis of these drivers is difficult, inefficient, or even completely inaccessible depending on the analysis.In this paper, we present Charm, a system solution that facilitates dynamic analysis of device drivers of mobile systems. Charm’s key technique is remote device driver execution, which enables the device driver to execute in a virtual machine on a workstation. Charm makes this possible by using the actual mobile system only for servicing the low-level and infrequent I/O operations through a low-latency and customized USB channel. Charm does not require any specialized hardware and is immediately available to analysts. We show that it is feasible to apply Charm to various device drivers, including camera, audio, GPU, and IMU sensor drivers, in different mobile systems, including LG Nexus 5X, Huawei Nexus 6P, and Samsung Galaxy S7. In an extensive evaluation, we show that Charm enhances the usability of fuzzing of device drivers, enables record-and-replay of driver’s execution, and facilitates detailed vulnerability analysis. Altogether, these capabilities have enabled us to find 25 bugs in device drivers, analyze 3 existing ones, and even build an arbitrary-code-execution kernel exploit using one of them.